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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
We have been told for centuries that lawyers are better than
others at being public officials, lawmakers in particular. And
without doubt, lawyers possess some attributes that suit them to
this work. But I will suggest in this Article that lawyers have one
significant flaw for doing public official work: they are accustomed
to representing clients' interests against the interests of all others,
including the public interest. This Article addresses only one aspect
of the lawyer's tradition of doing public service and proposes a
recalibration of the value of lawyers serving as public officials.
This Article is exclusively about one popular form of the citizen
lawyer: the lawyer in public life, government office, or leadership in
a profession's organizations.' I am not discussing here other forms
of the citizen lawyer: the lawyer who does pro bono work;2 the
lawyer who works for organizations that challenge injustice;3 the
lawyer generally, simply working in the dispute resolution or
economic system who is doing a public good by that ordinary lawyer
work is not my subject. Nor is my subject the lawyer who represents
the government as a lawyer-such as a prosecutor, a Department of
Justice lawyer, or a White House counsel. These lawyers are meant
to be lawyers, representing a particular kind of client, the govern-
ment.4 My subject is the lawyer who is a lawmaker, administrator
1. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OFTHE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993) (describing the decline of the lawyer-statesman and a morale crisis for the
legal profession in America).
2. See Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2009)
(discussing "the bar's responsibilities not only to engage in pro bono work, but also to support
a system that makes legal services widely available to those who need them most").
3. See Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer-A Brief Informal History of a Myth with
Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169,1169 (2009) (defining the citizen lawyer
as one "who acts in a significant part of his or her professional life with some plausible vision
of the public good, the general welfare in mind").
4. Although the government lawyer's role is adjusted from the private lawyer's role,
giving more consideration to the public interest. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers,
Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C.
L. REV. 789 (2000); James E. Moliterno, The Federal Government Lawyer's Duty To Breach
Confidentiality, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 633 (2005). Compare In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a federal Whitewater
investigation subpoena was effective to acquire materials from White House counsel because
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or improver: a legislator; an administrative agency official enforcing
law;5 a lawyer working on changes in the law through work with the
ALI, the ABA, or a state bar committee.
Part I of this Article recounts, and does not substantially disagree
with, the rationales traditionally given for lawyers having a
comparative advantage in the skills and temperaments that make
a good public official or lawmaker.
Part II compares the role of the lawyer with the role of public
official, and points out one crucial comparative disadvantage for
lawyers as public officials: lawyers are accustomed to representing
client interests to the virtual exclusion of the interests of others or
the public interest.
Part III uses the example of the turn of the twentieth century
organized bar's pursuit of advertising sanctions against plaintiffs
lawyers, its effort to raise educational standards for admission to
keep immigrants out of the profession, and other acts of civic
involvement, all of which were aimed in part at increasing the
wealth and protecting the interests of the clients and former clients
of the citizen lawyers. Much of this activity was undertaken by
members of the bar who were also public officials in one sense or
another. At a minimum, the makers of these rules were making the
law governing lawyers and the attendant public policy choices. Some
aspects of this civic involvement by lawyers may be nothing more
than one might expect: lawyers doing lawyers' work in the interests
of their clients, but unfortunately doing that work in part while
engaged as a public servant or lawmaker. I will suggest that
lawyers serving as public officials, especially making laws, may too
often continue to act as lawyers act; they serve the interests of their
clients while they are acting as public servants.6
of the limited attorney-client privilege), with Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,
410-11 (1998) (holding that a federal Whitewater investigation subpoena was ineffective at
obtaining private counsel's notes even though the client, a Deputy White House Counsel, was
deceased).
5. Cf. Edward Rubin, The Citizen Lawyer and the Administrative State, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1335, 1378 (2009) ("We do ourselves and our students a disservice if we fail to take
[the administrate state] seriously and fail to redefine our notions of ethical behavior in
response to it.").
6. While acting as a public official, of course, the citizen lawyer has no ordinary clients.
But they do have former clients, often the current clients of the citizen lawyer's former law
partners, and often the same law partners and clients to whom the citizen lawyer will return
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I am not suggesting any evil motive or flaw of the heart. I simply
mean that by training and experience, lawyers tend to favor client
interests, with less than normal regard for the interests of others
and the public. In this respect, the person we usually regard as a
good and able lawyer is not a particularly good citizen. A citizen
would put the interest of the public first, and personal interests
second.' As a lawyer, client interests properly come first and are
only overcome by the gravest of threats to the public interests or the
interests of others.8 This is as it is and should be. A client-favoring
posture is in large measure the definition of the lawyer's role.
Certainly we do not expect lawyers to do a simple balance between
the interests of their clients and the interests of others, and serve
whichever interest is the weightier or more meritorious or more
worthy. But it is not the role of the public official to serve an
interest over that of the general public. Public officials are meant to
be specifically empowered, good citizens. When lawyer-public
officials act like lawyers, they are not properly performing the public
official role. This 'lawyer behavior" by public officials may make
them less valuable than others when filling the roles of public life.
Lawyers lead a client-centered life.
Why should I worry about this? Do lawyers who are in public
service tend to favor the interests of their clients, former clients,
and so on? Surely not always. But if there is some tendency toward
that defect, then it is an aspect of the lawyer that is ill-suited to
public service. And being aware of that tendency and its pernicious
effects may aid in identifying and eliminating the phenomenon
when it occurs. On balance we may in the end conclude that the
advantages of lawyers in public life outweigh this disadvantage and
that lawyers are well-suited to be public officials. But knowing of
upon completion of the public official duties.
7. For a most exaggerated example of what a good citizen would do, see JEAN-JACQUES
RoussEAu, EMILE OR ON EDUCATION 40 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1979) (1762).
Rousseau relates the story of a Spartan mother who asked an arriving Helot for news. When
he told her that her five sons were killed in the battle, she retorted, "Base slave, did I ask you
that?" He replied, "We won the victory." The woman then dashed to the temple to give thanks
to the gods. Id.
8. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 1.6(b) (2008) (describing the limited
circumstances when a lawyer can breach her duty of confidentiality).
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this disadvantage is worth something in any event. It should be
guarded against with regulation of lawyers who are public officials.
In the end, I am simply saying that it may be harder for lawyers
than nonlawyers to be good citizens. And a public official is first a
citizen, one with special power. To be a good citizen, and a good
public official, lawyers have a special burden: they must shed their
training, experience, and inclination to represent the interests of a
client despite the contrary interests of the public.
I. WHY WE SAY THAT LAWYERS ARE AT A COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE FOR BEING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Some attributes of lawyers make them especially well-suited to
serve as public officials. The lawyer is trained to see and analyze a
problem from every angle and to consider every aspect, argument,
and view. Lawyers know how the law works and how government
works, and as such may be especially able in government office and
lawmaking roles Many lawyers possess special forensic skills
and can present positions clearly and effectively. Lawyers tend to
appreciate the need and value of process. For all these reasons, one
quite reasonably might suggest that lawyers have a special capacity
for public life and leadership.
The government and democracy is favourable to the political
power of lawyers; for when the wealthy, the noble and the prince
are excluded from the government, the lawyers take possession
of it in their own right, as it were, since they are the only men of
information and sagacity, beyond the sphere of the people who
can be the object of popular choice.1°
Lawyers often and with good reason have been thought to be
particularly suited for public life, and, in fact, lawyers make up a
substantial portion of those in government offices and other public
9. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Thoughts About Citizen Lawyers, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1153, 1164 (2009) (discussing how lawyers are well-versed in the "structural
variable"-the way social, legal, and nonlegal institutions interact).
10. David Podmore, Lawyers and Politics, 4 BRIT. J.L. & SoC'Y 155, 163 (1977) (quoting
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, PART I, at 1285 (Oxford Univ. Press 1947)
(1835)).
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positions. Commentators and scholars have long and richly cel-
ebrated the citizen or statesman lawyer ideal and noted how legal
training and practice can prepare individuals for public life."
An important argument for why lawyers are considered better
at public life than the ordinary individual is that there exist many
transferable skills between law and politics. 2 Whereas some schol-
ars have noted that in certain circumstances, legal education fails
political and public life, nonetheless, "many of the qualities and
skills which lawyers acquire during their professional training and
polish in their daily practice are the same qualities and skills which
are essential for success in community and political activities."'3
Lawyers, unlike most other individuals, are trained to understand
the government and how the law works. As a North Carolina judge
explained in a speech given to a North Carolina bar association in
1925, 'The lawyer who has studied government and the laws and
constitutional principles ... to the practical operations of govern-
ment has gained an equipment which fits him, beyond most of his
fellow citizens, for public service." 4 Or as Elihu Root more famously
explained, 'The study and exposition of existing laws, of course,
tends to qualify men to be makers of law, and to a less degree to
administer the law."'5 Lawyers' specialized training in understand-
ing how laws are applied gives them a knowledge base that can be
put to great use in public life.
Root, in his turn of the twentieth-century generation, was the
quintessential citizen lawyer. He had created a successful law
11. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 109; Robert E. Scott, The Lawyer as Public Citizen, 31
U. TOL. L. REv. 733, 733-34 (2000) (calling for a return of the Jeffersonian lawyer as a public
citizen ideal); Timothy J. Sullivan, The Legal Profession and Its Future: Recapturing the Ideal
of the Statesman-Lawyer, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 479-81 (1998) (arguing that there is a need
to move back toward the education of statesman-lawyers, noting that "[iun singular ways,
lawyers are guarantors of the success of the American experiment).
12. See Podmore, supra note 10, at 168-71 (summarizing the transferable skills between
law and politics). But see generally Sanford Levinson, What Should Citizens (as Participants
in a Republican Form of Government) Know About the Constitution?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1239 (2009) (arguing that nonlawyers sometimes operate as "citizen lawyers" on certain legal
issues, like constitutional interpretation); Mark Tushnet, Citizen as Lawyer, Lawyer as
Citizen, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379 (2009) (same).
13. Podmore, supra note 10, at 171.
14. Frank A. Daniels, The Lawyer as a Citizen-His Duty to the Public, 3 N.C. L. REV. 156,
158 (1925).
15. Elihu Root, Some Duties of American Lawyers to American Law, Commencement
Address Before the Yale Law School (June 27, 1904), in 14 YALE L.J. 63, 64 (1904).
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practice representing banks, railroads, and financiers.16 He under-
took government appointments to be Secretary of War, Secretary of
State, and became a U.S. Senator.17 He won the Nobel Prize in 1912,
and moved back and forth between returning to his practice,
government, and leadership roles in the ABA.18 He spoke with great
eloquence about the lawyer's duty and talent for engaging in public
life.19
Another set of skills that legal education and practice provides
is the ability to speak, write, and debate well. In order to be a
successful lawyer, students must learn to speak and write persua-
sively. In the nineteenth century for example, scholars noted that
one of the most valuable attainments for a lawyer was eloquence,2"
a skill that easily benefits public life.2' These skills "are of vital
importance to the politician-in speaking, in writing and arguing,
in organising. By virtue of his training and daily activities the
lawyer becomes master of both the spoken and written word .. 22
Further, "self-confidence, debating skills, persuasive abilities and
articulateness which lawyers typically develop through the practice
of their profession, is also a formidable asset to a political career.'28
While Arthur Wood and Walter Wardwell argued in the 1950s that
the reasons lawyers often find themselves participating in public
affairs has more to do with self-interested factors outside of their
law school training, such as self-selection and the need for lawyers
to meet people to develop their practice, they still noted that
lawyers "receive rigorous training in the logic of reasoning and
develop a facility with language. And, of course, they acquire a
specific knowledge of the law which fits them for certain public
16. NOBEL FOUNDATION, NOBEL LECTURES IN PEACE: 1901-1925, at 263 (Frederick W.
Haberman ed., 1972).
17. Id. at 263-64.
18. Id.
19. See Root, supra note 15, at 63-64.
20. See Philip Gaines, The "True Lawyer" in America: Discursive Construction of the Legal
Profession in the Nineteenth Century, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 132, 150-51 (2001) (reviewing
nineteenth-century writing on the legal profession and the importance of eloquence for
advocacy lawyers).
21. Eloquence was an even more valuable tool in the nineteenth century, before the dawn
of the office lawyer as the elite lawyer model.
22. See Podmore, supra note 10, at 168 (footnote omitted).
23. Id.
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offices and other positions of authority."24 This facility for language
that lawyers learn through their education and practice is an
important skill that benefits any public career.
Another important skill that lawyers learn is the ability to think
quickly on their feet-a skill that is necessary for any public leader
who must often make important decisions or answer questions at a
moment's notice. As Elihu Root noted, "The capacity to get the sense
of a document in the shortest possible time, and the faculty of rapid
decision-both of which are so necessary in court-are useful in an
administrative office."25
Also, lawyers, through their interaction with clients and life, are
trained to have strong interpersonal skills. The best lawyers are
able to understand how other people think in order to effectively
interact with them and be persuasive. The typical nineteenth-
century lawyer "is brought in contact, in his daily work, with all
classes and conditions of society, he knows the existing laws, their
excellencies and defects, hence, other things being equal, he is
certainly best qualified to act wisely as the legislator."2 At its best,
modern legal education explicitly teaches lawyers to be versatile,
understand, and interact with different types of people. The ability
"to understand and get along with [people]" that lawyers are
encouraged to have is indispensable in public life.27
Many positions in public life also demand the ability to move
between different subjects and concerns all the time, a skill that
many lawyers acquire.28 Perhaps the best argument made in this
strain was by Elihu Root in 1904:
The lawyer thus naturally tends to avoid the running into a rut
of narrow experience and activity, which makes so many men
who are able in their own particular business worthless for
anything else.
24. Arthur L. Wood & Walter I. Wardwell, The Lawyer and Community Leadership, 9 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 162, 173 (1956).
25. Root, supra note 15, at 64.
26. S.D. Wright, The Citizen as Lawyer, 5 W. JURIST 337, 338 (1871); see also Gaines,
supra note 20, at 150 (noting how good lawyers understand people, what makes them "tick,"
and use this knowledge to be persuasive).
27. Podmore, supra note 10, at 168.
28. An argument could be made that the increasing specialization of the legal profession
makes this less true now than it was before.
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More important is the adaptation for public office which results
from the variety of a lawyer's experience and training of.... But
I think the chief reason why so many lawyers tend naturally to
public office is that every public office is quite different from any
private business, and it is much easier and more natural for the
lawyer, with his varied experience and his habit of transplanting
himself frequently from one set of interests and ideas to another,
to meet the different requirements of public office, than it is for
any other member of the community.29
Lawyers' ability to adapt suits them well for public life, which often
requires the ability to grasp and solve different types of problems.
Another argument that has been made historically for why
lawyers are particularly suited for public life is that they are trained
to be impartial and act unselfishly. The Framers of the Constitution
viewed lawyers as the "virtuous political elite," who were somehow
less selfish and "therefore better equipped for political leadership
and disinterested decision-making than merchants and business-
men."3 ° The same argument was made at the turn of the twentieth
century, with Root noting that "[n]o one is so well fitted as the
lawyer to ascertain the true limits of official authority, and no one
can do so much as he, to form public opinion regarding this class of
questions, upon the lines not of partisan political advantage, but of
independent and impartial judgment."31 All but the last point is
clearly true: lawyers' fare is the prediction of the limits of official
authority. But lawyers are trained to use this knowledge as a
partisan in the interests of a client, even though advising the client
in objective terms is part of that service. Legal educators tend to
preach to students about serving the public's interest over those of
clients and personal interests but then send them into a legal
environment at odds with their preaching. Even Patrick Henry
and Thomas Jefferson joined many other prominent citizen lawyers
in placing advertisements advising prospective clients that they
29. Root, supra note 15, at 64-65.
30. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUND'rABLE 381, 386 (2001) (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 253 (1991)).
31. Root, supra note 15, at 75.
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would not undertake to represent them unless their fee was paid
up front.32
Many lawyers and legal scholars have also pointed out that
lawyers, for various reasons, have a duty to become involved in
public life.33 Throughout its history, the American legal profession
has been celebrated for its exalted position that is believed to instill
upon its practitioners certain public duties.34 Many scholars have
criticized the legal profession for failing to live up to this ideal.35
And some have noted that the failure to live up to this ideal has
created a serious void in our society.36
The unique training that lawyers receive through their legal
education and their legal practice instill within them certain skills
that specifically benefit public life. They learn to understand and
apply the law, sharpen their facility for language, learn how to
understand and interact with diverse groups of people, and sharpen
their ability to adapt and act in different types of circumstances.
32. 1 ANTON-HERMONN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 41
n.109 (1965); see also Erwin C. Surrency, The Lawyer and the Revolution (1964), reprinted in
READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 74 (Dennis R. Nolan ed.,
1980).
33. See Mary Ann Dantuono, A Citizen Lawyer's Moral, Religious, and Professional
Responsibility for the Administration of Justice for the Poor, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383, 1390
(1998) (arguing that the practice of law requires further involvement in the development of
law itself and law students should be taught ways to fulfill their public responsibilities); Root,
supra note 15, at 65 ("And the lawyer's profession demands of him something more than the
ordinary public service of citizenship. He has a duty to the law. In the cause of peace and
order and human rights against all injustice and wrong, he is the advocate of all men, present
and to come.").
34. See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 20, at 135-42; Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton,
Original Sin and Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability for Justices, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1105 (2009) (discussing how citizen lawyers are obligated to protect the
integrity of the judiciary).
35. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 38 (2000) (noting that the failure of the legal profession to promote more public
service activity is a loss to both the profession and the public); see also KRONMAN, supra note
1, at 166-67 (blaming the law and economics movement for undermining the ideal of the
statesman-lawyer).
36. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 363 (arguing that social science programs cannot fill
the void left by the demise of the lawyer-statesman ideal because they are too "narrowly
intellectual" while the "lawyer-statesman ideal is an ideal of character"); see also Bruce A.
Green & Russell G. Pearce, "Public Service Must Begin at Home" The Lawyer as Civics
Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207 (2009) (discussing the conception
of citizen lawyer qua "civics teacher").
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All of these skills profit public life and likely explain why so many
lawyers find themselves in public positions.
II. THE LAWYER'S ROLE AND THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL'S ROLE
Skills and talents aside, the lawyer's role is a poor fit with that of
the public official. Lawyers' work and training are client-centered.
Client goals are paramount with only modest constraints imposed
by the countervailing interests of others or the public generally. Not
so for the public official, who as a specially empowered good citizen,
places the public interest first.
A. The Lawyer's Role
Within only very loose constraints, lawyers seek the private good
of their clients and disregard the interests of the public. That is our
role. If our client wants something lawful that harms another, even
that does injustice to another, we seek our client's goal. If our client
wants something lawful that harms the public good, we seek our
client's goal. The lawyer is not generally a broad, public-good seeker.
Only in gross instances of harm to the public good is the lawyer
permitted under ethical norms to betray her client's interests
(revealing information to prevent very serious future harm, for
example)." Our ethical norms and the lawyer's accepted role exalt
advancing client goals to the detriment of others.
This is no criticism of lawyers. This is what lawyers do. It is what
lawyers have done for centuries. It is what makes lawyers lawyers,
and what makes lawyers useful. We advance our clients' good over
that of others, even when the result might be unjust, and we
advance our client's good over the public good except in rare and
extreme instances.
What is the role of a lawyer then?
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client
by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to
other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only
37. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 1.6(b) (2008).
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duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm,
the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he
must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion."
Lord Brougham's classic rendition of the lawyer's role is surely
overstated and subject to exception and criticism. It has more often
been criticized than praised by academic writers.39 But nonetheless,
even discounted for its exaggeration, it makes clear that lawyers are
primarily interested in advancing their clients' lawful aims and all
other interests are a distant second. More modernly, we have rules
that permit a lawyer to withdraw when the client's course is highly
repugnant.4 °
A more tailored than Brougham's, but nonetheless strong
statement of the lawyer's client-centered duty, was given by former
ABA President, Justice Lewis Powell.41 Writing in the case that at
long last struck down citizenship requirements as a lawyer qualifi-
cation, he said:
Lawyers frequently represent foreign countries and the
nationals of such countries in litigation in the courts of the
United States, as well as in other matters in this country. In
such representation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as
an "officer of the court," is to further the interests of his clients
by all lawful means, even when those interests are in conflict
with the interests of the United States or of a State. But this
representation involves no conflict of interest in the invidious
38. 2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 18 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821) (quoting Lord
Brougham); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, "Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and
Well-Considered Opinion"--Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1221 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Joseph A. Colquitt, Evidence and Ethics: Litigating in the Shadows of the
Rules, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1641, 1667 (2007); Scott A. Fredricks, The Irresponsible Lawyers:
Why We Have an Amoral Profession, 11 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 133, 151 (2006); Duncan Webb,
Keeping the Crown's Conscience: A Theory of Lawyering for Public Sector Counsel, 5 N.Z. J.
PUB. & INTrL L. 243, 249 (2007).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROVIL CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2008). This rule does not require
withdrawal, and the rationale for this rule is as much to ensure the client will get a lawyer
who can advance his interests with zeal rather than one who is conflicted about the
representation.
41. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973).
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sense. Rather, it casts the lawyer in his honored and traditional
role as an authorized but independent agent acting to vindicate
the legal rights of a client, whoever it may be.42
Despite talk of public service obligations, the organized bar has
never embraced an ethic of more-than-optional public service
for lawyers.4 3 Neither has it embraced justice as a lawyer's pri-
mary goal, despite William Simon's persuasive argument to the
contrary." The legal profession was embarrassed by Monroe
Freedman's candor when he asserted that the criminal defense
lawyer's duty was to argue even false inferences for his client.45 But
Freedman and Simon both described what they saw: a profession
whose members were animated by the adversary excuse and their
role as partisans.
Perhaps no more lasting description of the lawyer's role exists
than Oliver Wendell Holmes's "The Path of the Law."4 In this
speech, Holmes explains that a lawyer sells her ability to predict the
consequences of proposed and past conduct by the client, Holmes's
"bad man."47 The bad man, every lawyer's client for Holmes, cares
nothing of the consequences of his actions to the public good, but
only of the consequences he will likely reap at the hands of public
officials.48 The lawyer's role for Holmes is to provide expert predic-
tions of those consequences, not to decline to serve the client if the
client's actions will harm others or the public, but rather to guide
the client in his evaluation of the personal consequences of his
actions, consequences imposed by public officials either in the form
of prosecution or by courts as a result of private litigation.49
42. Id.
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2008); George Ballman, Jr., Amended
Rule 6.1: Another Move Towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is That What We Want?, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1139, 1141-46 (1994).
44. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 9 (1998).
45. Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (1966); see also William H. Simon,
"Thinking Like a Lawyer"About Ethical Questions, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8 (1998); William
H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L.
REv. 29, 36.
46. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
47. Id. at 459.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 461. David Luban's "morally activist lawyer" stands in perhaps the starkest
2009] 1273
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Holmes taught us that lawyers represent "the bad man" 5 -one
who cares only for his own good and the consequences that may be
taken by public agencies (criminal prosecution, administrative
consequences, or orders of court at the instance of private plaintiffs)
as a result of his actions.5' Lawyers, Holmes said, do not calculate
the niceties of justice or the public interest against those of the
client.5 2 Rather, Holmes said essentially that lawyers sell their
expertise and judgment about official consequences to their clients.53
Lawyers are partisans. There is nothing shameful in that. It is
what makes lawyers lawyers in some sense. A lawyer's role is to
advance the lawful interest of her client, without regard for whether
those interests harm the interests of others (they most often do), or
whether those interests are at odds with more general notions of the
public's interest.
Good lawyers are partisans in this sense. This is not an attribute
from which professional (as opposed to popular) approbation comes.
It is what distinguishes lawyers, especially American lawyers. In
our adversarial justice system, despite contrary-sounding happy
talk, the lawyer's proper role is to advocate for her client while the
other party's lawyer advocates for hers, all before an impartial
judge. Whether we are correct or not, our justice system operates on
the premise that this pitting of sides against one another produces
justice. This believed-in result is what we rely on in describing a
lawyer's role morality. The lawyer who properly plays her role
within a moral system is moral, even if particular acts might offend
notions of general morality.
Of course the lawyer's pursuit of client aims has limits. The goals
sought and the means undertaken must themselves be lawful.54 At
least they must be supported by nonfrivolous arguments.55 We do
not require the lawyer to objectively or subjectively believe that the
client's positions will prevail. We ask only that the lawyer have
nonfrivolous support.56
contrast to the Holmes description. See DAVID LUBAN, LAYWERS AND JUSTICE (1988).
50. Holmes, supra note 46, at 459.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 461.
53. Id.
54. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2008).
55. Id. R. 3.1.
56. Id.
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The lawyer's role does permit a lawyer to withdraw from repre-
senting a client when the client's goals are repulsive to the lawyer,57
and generally insulates the lawyer from a requirement of agreeing
with a client's political, social, or moral views or activities.5" But we
counsel lawyers not to take such a position lightly, and we base our
support for that "limit" on the worry that a client will not receive
adequate representation from a repulsed lawyer.59 Instead, we take
professional pride in the lawyer who represents the unpopular client
without regard to the lawyer's own views.' The profession prides
itself on the ethic of separation from a client's moral position. So
this 'limit" is hardly one at all.
Even in the "kinder, gentler" world of the transactional lawyer,
lawyers are meant to take sides. In this setting, they may often
represent clients whose interests may be served by compromise and
accommodations, but even the extensive literature on cooperative
negotiation emphasizes that it is the client's interests that must
be faithfully pursued.6' The creative, cooperative lawyer may find
that her client's interests can be advanced while another party's
interests are advanced as well, but the lawyer is not motivated by
a desire to advance another's interests." It is only when this
alignment advances the lawyer's client's interests that pursuing it
is desirable. And when the interests of the client part from another's
57. Id. R. 1.16(b)(4).
58. Id. R. 1.2(b).
59. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Duty of a Lawyer To Represent Clients, Repugnant and
Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 215, 216-18 (David
Luban ed., 1984).
60. Witness the legion of books telling Clarence Darrow's storied career. See, e.g.,
ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957); CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF
MY LIFE (Da Capo Press 1996) (1932); RICHARD J. JENSEN, CLARENCE DARROW: THE CREATION
OF AN AMERICAN MYTH (1992); MIKE PAPONTONIO, CLARENCE DARROW THE JOURNEYMAN:
LESSONS FOR THE MODERN LAWYER (1997); KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY (1979);
PHYLLIS VINE, ONE MAN'S CASTLE: CLARENCE DARROW IN DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM
(2004); ARTHUR WEINBERG & LILA WEINBERG, CLARENCE DARROW: A SENTIMENTAL REBEL
(1980); see also Charles Friend, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundation of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976).
61. See, e.g., Sandra S. Beckwith & Sherri Goren Slovin, The Collaborative Lawyer as
Advocate: A Response, 18 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 497, 501 (2003); Ted Schneyer, The
Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in Professional Change, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 298 (2008).
62. ROGER FISHER, BRUCE PATRON & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 54 (1991).
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interests, the lawyer invariably and properly becomes a distributive
bargainer, extracting a dollar for her client from her bargaining
opponent's client. As they should, lawyers advance the only loosely
limited interest of their clients, not the interests of justice or the
public interests.
There is, however, one aspect of lawyers' training that lends itself
well to ascertaining the public's interest. In law school classes, some
time is spent in discussion of what the law should be, as opposed to
what the law is. In these moments, we are discussing the broader
interests of the public: what law would best serve the public's
interest at large? These are valuable discussions, but even these
become lost and have grave weaknesses.
The discussions are weak because few law professors actually
know how to evaluate the data and interests that would inform such
a conversation. We are, most of us, kindergarten social scientists.
We make not-so-educated guesses about what the effect on truth-
telling will be when the speaker is near death, or what reaction
product makers will have to different versions of the subsequent
remedial measures rule. Few of us can handle the empiricism
needed for such a conversation and fewer still bother to try.
Even the constructive conversations about what the law should
be inevitably become lost in the deluge of attention that is paid to
studying what the law is. They get lost in the deluge of attention
that is paid to figuring out what the law is for the bar exam. And
they get lost in the vast majority of the lawyer's daily work with
what the law is and how it can be used to a client's, and not the
public's, advantage.
Even the greatest citizen lawyers still have behaved as lawyers,
and properly so. As mentioned, Patrick Henry and Thomas Jeffer-
son, for example, published notices that they would not accept
clients who would not pay their fee up front.6" They were doing a
perfectly ordinary and respectable thing: they were ensuring that
their services would be paid for.
63. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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B. The Public Official's Role
As a public official, the public interest is supreme. "[L]egislators
must be genuinely oriented toward enacting laws that are in the
common good or public interest."' The public official's role is that
of an exalted citizen with special public authority, one who puts the
public's interest first and who possesses the power to execute on
that priority. To the extent that as a lawyer, a public official might
favor the interests of the lawyer-officials or former clients, or
expected future clients, or the clients of the lawyer's former law
firm, that lawyer would be acting as a lawyer at the expense of the
proper service as a public official.
Perhaps I am naive about how public officials do their work
generally. Perhaps all public officials, lawyers or not, are in reality
captured by a "client" of one sort or another, a special interest, a
constituency. Perhaps. But if I am naive and this is how public
officials work, then it should be no praise of lawyers who enter
public life to have entered such work. They will simply have traded
working for a client in one context, an open, honest, forthright one,
to working for a client in a more surreptitious way, the way of a
poor public official, with the lawyer-public official's goals and
interests the ultimate and paramount ones. If I am naive about
public officials generally, then the praise we heap on lawyers who
engage in such work 5 is misplaced and undeserved.
Generally, modern political theory has revolved around two
theories of democratic representation." On one side stands the
trustee framework, in which the voters elect a representative 67 and
64. Adrian Vermeule, Instrumentalisms, 120 HARV.L.REV. 2113,2127 (2007) (quoting and
reviewing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS MEANS To AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 250
(2006)).
65. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 11-12.
66. This Article deals largely with theories of democratic representation. The same
principles should apply equally strongly to those who serve in various government positions
for a limited period of time. Such individuals largely serve to advise those who have been
elected, or to carry out their policies. In either case, the same considerations and frameworks
should be applicable to their decision-making process. In the case of those who serve as
advisors to the elected, this is most plain. In the case of those who carry out their policies, a
similar decision-making process will naturally occur in those areas where there is ambiguity
in the laws/policies the elected representatives have enacted, and in those areas in which the
unelected individual or organization has discretion in carrying out the policy.
67. Legislators and elected representatives are not the only public officials that act as
20091 1277
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
entrust that representative with the authority to make policy
decisions based on his own judgment of the prudent course.68 On the
other side stands the delegate or mandate framework, in which the
voters elect a representative and entrust him only with the power
to follow the voters' mandate.69 That is to say, under the delegate
framework the representative acts to effectuate the voters' policy
judgment, regardless of whether that judgment comports with his
own judgment of what is prudent.7 °
Edmund Burke's is the classic exposition of the trustee concept of
democratic representation:
But authoritative instructions, mandate issued, which a member
[of Parliament] is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote,
and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his
judgment and conscience; these are things utterly unknown to
the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental
mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different
and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an
agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but
Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one
interest, that of the whole-where not local purposes, not local
prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from
the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed;
but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but
he is a member of Parliament. If the local constituent should
have an interest or should form a hasty opinion evidently
opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the
member for that place ought to be as far as any other from any
endeavor to give it effect.7
representatives. Bureaucrats, although not elected, have certain discretionary authority that
places them in a representative role for the public. Administrative agencies perform several
discretionary functions such as rule making, licensing, and contracting. Public administrators
also often propose legislation and then decide how it is implemented after it is passed.
Bureaucrats, therefore, have the same ethical responsibilities as elected officials because of
the high level of discretion they are given in the policy-making process.
68. See James Conniff, Burke, Bristol, and the Concept of Representation, 30 W. POL. Q.
329, 330 (1977).
69. See James H. Kuklnski & Donald J. McCrone, The Delegate Theory of Representation,
23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 278, 280 (1979).
70. Id.
71. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in EDMUND BURKE,
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Edmund Burke gave this speech in the late eighteenth century
in Ireland.72 In it he is emphatic that, in his view, the duty of a
member of Parliament is not simply to advocate the interests of the
locality that elected him, but to balance the various interests pulling
the British Empire in various directions.3 The more complex and
varied the state, the stronger Burke's claim becomes. Among the
most important points made by Burke is his rejection of the delegate
view: "Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different
and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an
agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates .... ,,7 Burke
emphatically tells the reader that members of Parliament are not
agents and advocates set up in an adversarial proceeding against
other agents and advocates.7" That, of course, is exactly how the
American legal system is designed to function and the role for which
American lawyers train.
Contemporaneous to and in contrast to Burke stands Rousseau,
who provides a clear exposition of delegate democracy:
With each word the deputy speaks in the diet, and with every
move he makes, he must already see himself under the eyes of
his constituents, and feel the future influence of their judgment
both on his hopes of advancement, and on that good opinion of
his compatriots which is indispensable to the realisation of those
hopes; for, after all, it is not to express their own private
sentiments, but to declare the will of the nation, that the nation
sends deputies to the diet .... I will add, in conclusion, that if
there were actually some disadvantage in holding the deputies
thus bound by their instructions, it could not outweigh the
immense advantage of preventing the law from ever being
anything but the real expression of the will of the nation.
[If the local assembly is unhappy with the vote of the deputy
they sent to the national diet], [1let them punish their deputies;
let them even, if necessary, cut off their heads, if they have
prevaricated ....76
PoLITIcs 116 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949).
72. Id. at 113.
73. Id. at 116.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland (1772), in
RoussEAu, POITICAL WRITINGS 194-95 (Frederick Watkins trans., 1953).
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Rousseau presents one of the more extreme versions of the
delegate view."7 Rousseau's fairly extreme view makes clear that
both delegate and trustee approaches to democracy exist on a
continuum."8 More importantly, in a diverse polity such widespread
agreement may be difficult to come by. 9 This difficulty may result
from the lack of clear policy demands on the part of most individual
voters,' or the incredible difficulty in synthesizing the views of
many individuals into a clear policy mandate.8 If a mandate only
results from agreement by some sufficient proportion of the
citizenry, mandates by the electorate may, therefore, be few and far
between.
Mandates and preferences of a constituency are notoriously
difficult to determine accurately.82 Additionally, it is not clear that
voters generally come to the polls with a clear policy mandate in
mind to guide either elected representatives, or those who
advise the representatives, or those who are directed by the repre-
sentatives to carry out the policies the representatives enact.8'
77. Rousseau seeks to make the representative mirror his constituents' views as closely
as possible by allowing those constituents to take their representative's heads if they do not
vote as they had desired. Id. Rousseau would still hold those constituents bound by the law
for which their representative voted against their wishes. Id. It is thus apparent that
although Rousseau's stance is fairly extreme, it is not necessarily the most extreme possible.
78. See also Richard W. Krause, Two Concepts of Democratic Representation: James and
John Stuart Mill, 44 J. POL. 509, 510-11 (1982) ("Carried to its logical extreme, each of these
views threatens to violate one of the Janus-faced requirements of the concept of
representation-delegate representation, by tending towards direct democracy at one remove
(with the represented no longer meaningfully 'absent) .... '); cf. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 4 (1972) (discussing the two views and stating, ' The truth may
lie somewhere in between, but if so, where does it lie, and how is one to decide?").
79. See Samantha Besson, The Paradox of Democratic Representation. On Whether and
How Disagreement Should be Represented, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION 125,
129 (Luc F. Wintgens ed., 2005); Iris Marion Young, Deferring Group Representation, in
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 349, 362 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997).
80. See John C. Wahlke, Policy Demand and Support System: The Role of the Represented,
1 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 271, 273-74 (1971).
81. See Heinz Eulau, Changing Views of Representation, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
SCIENCE: TOWARD EMPIRICAL THEORY 53, 70 (Ithiel de Sola Pool ed., 1967).
82. See Marjorie Randon Hershey, The Meaning of a Mandate: Interpretation of "Mandate"
in 1984 Presidential Election Coverage, 27 POLITY 225, 228 (1994). It appears that this
argument would weaken as the size of the electorate shrinks. At the local level it may be that
there is less diversity in views, fewer discrete issues, and that clear and discrete positions are
more easily identifiable.
83. Wahlke, supra note 80, at 274. Wahlke gives a number of reasons for why people do
not vote with clear policy mandates in mind: (1) "Few citizens entertain interests that clearly
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Furthermore, at least in American politics, "the fragmentation built
into the U.S. political structure, and the tendency toward split party
control of the presidency and Congress" weighs against the possibil-
ity of a policy mandate.' The issue here is that even though a
president is elected by a wide margin, if the electorate at the same
time chooses to leave the other party in control of the Congress,
then identifying a clear mandate that elected representatives and
other public servants must follow becomes difficult.85
Of course, if a lawyer-legislator could determine her mandate,
zealously following a mandate or directive from a client is exactly
what lawyers are trained to do. More importantly, a lawyer is
trained and indeed his professional codes demand that he follow the
directives of his client even if the lawyer himself believes that the
directive of the client does not serve the best interest of all con-
cerned. Indeed, it would seem that one of the more challenging parts
of the attorney's training is his striving to overcome the desire to act
in the way he thinks most just, and rather act as his client directs.
This is so even though that in its isolated context, the result is not
the one the lawyer judges to create the greatest benefit in sum for
the parties involved. The justification for the legal profession's
departure from what we would normally judge the prudent and
moral course is grounded in the utilitarian assumption that the
represent 'policy demands' or 'policy expectations', or wishes and desires that are readily
convertible into them."; (2) "Few people even have thought-out, consistent, and firmly held
positions on most matters of public policy."; (3) "It is highly doubtful that policy demands are
entertained even in the form of broad orientations, outlooks, or belief systems."; (4) "Large
proportions of citizens lack the instrumental knowledge about political structures, processes,
and actors that they would need to communicate policy demands or expectations if they had
any."; (5) "Relative few citizens communicate with their representatives."; (6) "Citizens are
not especially interested or informed about the policy-making activities of their
representatives as such."; (7) "Nor are citizens much interested in other day-to-day aspects
of parliamentary functioning."; (8) "Relatively few citizens have any clear notion that they are
making policy demands or policy choices when they vote." Id.
84. Hershey, supra note 82, at 253 (generalizing while examining the issue of whether the
1984 election gave President Reagan a policy mandate); see also id. at 250-54.
85. The 2006 election and the Iraq war are instructive in that this election is often cited
as a clear condemnation of the way things are progressing and a mandate to "get out of Iraq."
See, e.g., T.J. Pignataro, Election Results Seen as Mandate for Peace, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 11,
2006, at D5. Upon further examination though, it is unclear that this is the actual mandate.
It appears that it would be more accurate to say that the mandate was "do something about
Iraq." If that is the case, however, that mandate offers little direction, but rather begs the
question, "What do we do about Iraq?"
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profession can produce sufficient benefits to society to outweigh
whatever harm is caused by its departure from customary moral-
ity.86
Whichever theory of representation one thinks more efficacious,
the public official's goal must be serving the public interest first and
foremost.
Ethics codes adopted by public officials and administrators
support this notion.87 The code of the American Society for Public
Administration ("ASPA") is such an example.88 Its code provides
ideal ethical norms for public officials.8" Its first provision com-
mands that public administrators make the public interest para-
mount.9 ° Public officials, according to the code, are required to hold
service to the public above any self-interest they may have.91 The
public trust is in the hands of government officials. Legislators and
public administrators have the responsibility of putting the values
of the public into effect as public policy.92
C. The Poor Fit
Lawyers by role are simply ill-suited to pursue a broad publicly
interested goal. They are trained and accustomed to identifying a
narrow interest of a client and advancing it without regard for the
public interest and within very loose constraints. 3 To the extent
that one or the other model of the lawmaker is better suited to
the lawyer's experience and mind-set, it is the delegate theory.94
A lawyer would be reasonably well-suited to identifying what a
constituency wants and treating that constituency's interest as a
client's, pursuing it without regard for considerations of the broader
86. DAVID LUBIN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 92 (1988).
87. Vera Vogelsang-Coombs & Larry A. Bakken, The Conduct of Legislators, in ETHICS,
GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A REFERENCE GUIDE 79, 80 (James S. Bowman &
Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1988).
88. The American Society for Public Administration: ASPA's Code of Ethics,
http://www.aspanet.orgtscriptcontent/index-codeofethics.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
89. Id.; Vogelsang-Coombs & Bakken, supra note 87, at 86.
90. American Society for Public Administration, supra note 88.
91. Id.; Vogelsang-Coombs & Bakken, supra note 87, at 86.
92. James Bowman, Introduction, in ETHICS, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 87, at 1.
93. See Webb, supra note 39, at 246-47.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
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public interest. There should be no celebration of lawyers acting in
the delegate model.
By training and experience, lawyers tend to favor clients' inter-
ests, with less than normal regard for the interests of others and the
public.95 In this respect, what we usually regard as a good and able
lawyer is not a particularly good citizen. A citizen would put the
interests of the public first, and personal interests second.9" As a
lawyer, client interests come first and are only overcome by the
gravest of threats to public interests of others, and this is as it
should be. A client-favoring posture is in large measure the
definition of the lawyer's role. Certainly we do not expect lawyers to
do a simple balance between the interest of their clients and the
interests of others, and serve whichever interest is the weightier or
more meritorious or more worthy. But it is not the role of the public
official to serve an interest over that of the general public. Public
officials are meant to be specially empowered, good citizens. When
lawyer-public officials act like lawyers, they are not properly per-
forming the public official role. This "lawyer behavior" by public
officials may make them less valuable than others when filling the
roles of public life. Lawyers lead a client-centered life.
This one aspect of the lawyer's role, the lawyer ethos, may be a
terrible disadvantage to the lawyer's capacity to do effectively
public service and public life. Lawyers represent clients, advance
the interests of others, typically for a fee, and within very broad
ranges. Lawyers represent the interest of clients, with little regard
for the public good or the legitimate competing interests of others or
the public generally. It is no shame on a lawyer to represent the
interests of a client effectively and to undermine the interests of
others for the gain of her client. That is the perfectly legitimate role
of the lawyer in representation. No one questions the propriety of a
lawyer who advances her client's interests at the expense of others.
But as a public official, the public interest is supreme. To the
extent that, as a lawyer, a public official might favor the interests
of the lawyer-official's clients or former clients, or expected future
clients, or the clients of the lawyer's former law firm, that lawyer
95. Webb, supra note 39, at 246-47.
96. For a most exaggerated example of what a good citizen would do, see ROUSSEAU, supra
note 7.
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would be acting as a lawyer at the expense of the proper service as
a public official.
Good citizens would act otherwise. Good citizens would make
broadly considered judgments of what was in the public interest and
pursue those interests. Even when a constituency wanted something
identifiable, if that desire was contrary to the public interest, the
citizen would pursue the public interest at whatever personal costs
might pertain. A good public servant or lawmaker would act as the
good citizen.
Can a lawyer put aside the lawyer's role when acting as a
legislator? Perhaps; and some surely do. But that is precisely the
point. A lawyer must eschew what he has been trained to do to be
a good legislator. It is a challenge to being a good legislator that
nonlawyers do not labor under.
III. EXAMPLES OF ROLE CONFLICT IN ACTION
There are small and large instances of this phenomenon at work
every day, most undoubtedly unknown. Here is one rather extreme
example that is both extensive and well-documented, from among
any number of this phenomenon at work.
Blatant, orchestrated examples like the one that follows happen
and are noticed from time to time. They are in part the result of this
client-centered disadvantage. But mostly this Article is not about
the blatant examples. Mostly I am referring to something much
more subtle and understated, something perhaps not even noticed
by the lawyer-legislator involved. I am not impugning the character
of the lawyer-legislator. I am suggesting that as lawyers our
training, experience, and focus are obstacles to identifying and
serving the public interest. Overcome by some, to be sure-perhaps
not even noticed by others-but an obstacle nonetheless.
There are more modern examples of lawyer-public officials
serving their clients' interests and their own, but for this purpose,
I will use the example of the citizen lawyers of what has been
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termed a golden age of lawyers97 and their activities in public
realms that served the goals of their clients.
This story has been ably and thoroughly told elsewhere," so a
summary will suffice here.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the leaders of the
American bar advanced the interests of their clients by creating a
law governing lawyers that excluded and punished lawyers whose
clients opposed the clients of the leading lawyers, the citizen
lawyers, the rulemakers.' Some of this work was done as leaders of
the ABA and some as members of legislatures."° These leading
lawyers proposed and adopted provisions restricting entry to the
profession and creating new ethical violations for the punishment
of lawyers who as a class represented the opponents of the leading
lawyers' clients. 1°' In their role as policymakers for the profession
and for the public generally, these public official lawyers served the
interests of their clients.
At the turn of the century, a wave of immigrants was entering
the country and some were becoming lawyers. Many of these urban,
ethnic lawyers became the first real personal injury plaintiffs' bar,
representing mostly injured workers and some consumers against
the corporate clients of the bar elite."0 2 The bar elite bemoaned this
development and pursued a series of strategies to deny the immi-
grant lawyers membership in the profession and dampen the
effectiveness of those already in it who represented these injured
workers. 103
In the late nineteenth century, "lawyers began to organize into
what at first were rather exclusionary voluntary bar associations to
insulate themselves from the rougher, unethical parts of the bar."'14
97. James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 781, 783 n.17 (1997). But cf. Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of
Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REv. 549, 553 (1996) (suggesting that "[w]e are surely living in
the literary Golden Age of nostalgia for the Golden Age of lawyering").
98. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 50 (1976); EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 40-41 (1953); Moliterno, supra note 97, at 783.
99. Moliterno, supra note 97, at 783.
100. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 46.
101. Moliterno, supra note 97, at 783.
102. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 48.
103. Id. at 50.
104. Walter W. Steele, Jr., Cleaning Up the Legal Profession: The Power to Discipline-The
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The demographics of those "rougher, unethical parts" can be
deduced from the location of the first bar association, New York
City,105 the arrival point of the great part of the immigrants who
began flooding into the country at about that time 10 6 and the
"dumping ground of the world,"'0° as one bar leader described the
city. Not only were these bar associations voluntary, but they
generally selected their membership "by invitation only,"'0 8 thus
assuring that undesirables would be effectively excluded. Indeed,
there was an early proposal to limit the number of members of the
ABA absolutely,' °9 whether members of the elite or not, thus
ensuring that room would be found only for the best of society.
The immigrant lawyers "were concentrated among the urban
solo practitioners," and their professional practices were declared
"unethical because established Protestant lawyers said [they
were].""0 It is amply clear that "[t]he impetus behind the 1908
Canons was in large measure a subterfuge for class and ethnic
hostility.""' Historians and lawyers alike have found that "[t]he
Judiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 420 (1978).
105. Id. at 419; see also Marvelle C. Webber, Origin and Uses of Bar Associations: Review
of Much Interesting History Relating to Organizations of the Legal Profession, Beginning with
Colonial Times and Extending to the Present, 7 A.B.A. J. 297, 297 (1921); Philip J. Wickser,
Bar Associations, 15 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 396 (1930).
106. See The Project for the Active Teaching of History, Immigration Facts 4-5, http://www.
path.coe.uh.edu/seminar2002/week2/immigrant-facts.pdf (showing New York City as the
arrival point of most immigrants) (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). This influx of immigration made
New York City, and because of its predominant population in the state, New York state as
well, the home of some of the most restrictive nativist legislation in the country, even in
matters unrelated to the bar. See MILTON R. KONVITz, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN
AMERICAN LAW 171 (1946) (arguing that "[t]aking New York, we find that it leads all the
states in the number of occupations in which aliens or non-declarants may not engage").
107. F.M. Danaher, Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education, 36 A.B.A. REP. 632, 646
(1911) [hereinafter Proceedings of the SLE, 1911].
108. Steele, supra note 104, at 420.
109. SUNDERLAND, supra note 98, at 40-41.
110. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 50.
111. Moliterno, supra note 97, at 811. They were a subterfuge because they were not openly
nativist. However, the reasons cited for requiring the code of ethics do specifically target the
practices of lower-class lawyers, who were in large part from poor and foreign backgrounds.
Id. Furthermore, the Committee's report has an overtly nativist tone despite its lack of
specific derogation. See also Comm. on Code of Prof'l Ethics, Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the
Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 A.B.A. REP. 600, 601 (1906) [hereinafter Report
on Professional Ethics]. The new advertising rules applied to all lawyers, those representing
corporations as well as those representing injured workers, just as laws against sleeping
under bridges apply to the rich and poor alike.
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ethical crusade that produced the Canons concealed class and
ethnic hostility,""' 2 and the content of "unethical" behavior therefore
became the behavior of the unfavored ethnicities, regardless of its
actual character. As Monroe Freedman commented, the Canons
"were motivated in major part by the large numbers of Catholic
immigrants from Italy and Ireland and Jews from Eastern Europe
beginning in about 1880."'l' In addition, "[d]eviance was less an
attribute of an act than a judgment by one group of lawyers about
the inferiority of another.""'
It was no coincidence that the immigrant lawyers' clients were
litigation opponents of the rulemakers' clients.
"Commercialization" was a concept of malleable meaning. It was
a marker of being an elite lawyer when applied to the attachment
of leading lawyers to the corporate, commercial world, and the mark
of a crass, disreputable lawyer when applied to the efforts of solo
and small firm lawyers to earn a living and represent the interests
of workers and other injured people, often pursuing claims against
the interests of the leading lawyers' clients." 5 As public officials,
many lawyers of the time engaged in public acts that advanced their
private and former law firm's clients." 6
The immigrant lawyers, who did not move in the circles of big
business, were inferior precisely because they were not from the
same Anglo-Saxon Protestant extraction as the elite lawyers gen-
erally were. Consequently, the elite drew up a code of ethics which,
"reflecting values appropriate to a small town, were easily adapt-
able to an equally homogeneous upper-class metropolitan constitu-
ency, where they served as a club against lawyers whose clients
were excluded from that culture: especially the urban poor, new
immigrants, and blue-collar workers.""' 7 Two planks of this code
were most prominent in their attack on lower-class lawyers; both
of them, however, can be united under the single appellation of
112. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 50.
113. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHiCS 3 (1990).
114. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 50.
115. Id. at 40.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 42.
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"commercialization of the profession, " "' or, more commonly, "am-
bulance chasing."'1 9
Among other measures, the bar leaders engaged the following
devices and provisions to aid their clients: increased educational
requirements; a reinvigorated good character requirement that was
used as a subterfuge; new citizenship requirements for lawyers; new
advertising prohibitions; and newly heightened supervision of
contingent fees. 2° The new prohibitions on advertising by lawyers
came to be enforced with an uncommon zeal. The first three of these
were used to prevent lawyers who were likely to represent injured
plaintiffs from entering the profession. The latter two were mea-
sures to handicap plaintiffs from retaining lawyers who would
represent them.
A. The Good Character Requirement
Although the requirement of good character has been in place for
admission to the bar since time immemorial,' 2 ' its potential for
abuse was thoroughly exploited against recent immigrants and the
poor in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, used as
a reinvigorated tool to keep the plaintiffs' lawyers from joining the
profession. "Much of the initial impetus for more stringent char-
acter scrutiny arose in response to an influx of Eastern European
immigrants, which threatened the profession's public standing.
Nativist and ethnic prejudices during the 1920's, coupled with
economic pressures during the Depression, fueled a renewed drive
for entry barriers.' 22 The statements of the bar leaders at the time
make this conclusion unavoidable.
118. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-
Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83
N.C. L. REV. 411, 429-30 (2005).
119. See AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 49.
120. See infra Part III.
121. See, e.g., Matthew A. Ritter, The Ethics of Moral Character Determination: An
Indeterminate Ethical Reflection upon Bar Admissions, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) ("Since
colonial times in America, good moral character has been singularly requisite for lawyers to
gain membership in a bar association"); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 494 (1985) (noting that "formal character
requirements for practicing attorneys span almost two millenia").
122. Rhode, supra note 121, at 499-500.
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In a speech to the American Bar Association, Clarence Lightner
announced that the real problem with the bar's image was "the
foreign element., 123 The idea "that there are in the profession
lawyers whose services cannot be bought at any price for immoral
use" was unknown "in communities having a large foreign popula-
tion., 124 A career in law "is regarded by them as a desirable, because
lucrative, business for their talented children." '25 Because of this
apparently universal quest for lucre (seemingly, according to
Lightner, unique to the foreign population),
[a]n undue proportion of young men seeking admission to the
Bar are of foreign birth or parentage, and they carry into the
profession the point of view that they have acquired from their
environment. The larger part of them have no character from a
professional point of view, except, perhaps, the much-vaunted
virtue of fidelity to the client.
126
The bar at the time identified the problem of character at the bar
with the problem of foreigners entering the bar; because foreigners
have no character, they must be the problem. 27 Or so the elite's
reasoning went.
The requirement was used during this time "to keep down the
underdogs."'28 In Pennsylvania, for example, the state that took its
character certification process to the greatest extreme, the reasons
given for rejecting good character certification were often superfi-
cial sounding, including such reasons as "[1]ittle regard for moral
principles" and "[n]o proper sense of right and wrong.1 29 Often,
however, they were simply excuses for rejecting an applicant
123. Clarence A. Lightner, A More Complete Inquiry into the Moral Character of Applicants




127. This way of thinking is betrayed even in the report recommending the adoption of a
code of ethics, in which the reasons for which a code is necessary are cited as "the shyster, the
barratrously inclined, the ambulance chaser, the member of the Bar with a system of
runners," characteristics which were applied primarily to foreigners. See Report on
Professional Ethics, supra note 111, at 601.
128. R.J. Gerber, Moral Character: Inquiries Without Character, 57 THE BAR EXAMINER 2,
15 (1988).
129. Walter C. Douglas, Jr., The Pennsylvania System Governing Admission to the Bar, 54
A.B.A. REP. 701, 703 (1929).
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disfavored for some reason. Such labels as "dull," "colorless," and
"stupid" were used as reasons for rejection.130 Some applicants were
rejected for crimes that their fathers, brothers, or even uncles
committed, and the Board even acknowledged this apparent
punishment of sons for the sins of their fathers without apology.131
Furthermore, two applicants were rejected because they had been
employed as runners by law offices, 132 and one was rejected for
seeing "no wrong in ambulance chasing, buying cases, employing
runners, and advertising.' 3 The lower and immigrant classes
engaged in these practices; the practices facilitated claims being
brought against the rulemakers' clients; therefore, these practices
were unethical, and support of them proved lack of good
character. 34 The otherwise useful character requirement, therefore,
was corrupted and used against qualified applicants for the bar,
furthering the goals of nativism and the corporate legal elite's
clients.
B. The Educational Requirements
The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) and the ABA's
Section of Legal Education feuded for several years. 35 Only the
values that the two shared could bring them together again: the
need to keep foreigners out of the practice of law as much as
possible. Auerbach observed that "teachers and practitioners edged
[closer] to a common crusade in which higher educational standards
would serve as an instrument of professionalization and, simulta-
neously, of professional purification.' ' 36 They began to reunite
because the ABA needed the AALS to enforce stricter educational
130. Id.
131. Id. at 703-05.
132. Id. at 703-04.
133. Id. at 704.
134. Douglas notes the rejection of four times as many applicants who had not graduated
from college as those who had, and clearly implies that the lack of a college education,
obviously limited almost entirely to the poorer classes, explains the lack of character. Id. at
705. The logical conclusion is that the poor lack character, and ought to be excluded from the
legal profession.
135. ESTHER LUCILE BROWN, LAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE 135 (1938);
SUNDERLAND, supra note 98, at 47-49.
136. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 94.
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standards for entry into law schools for the specific purpose of
excluding immigrants and their children from the legal profession.
The wealthy were the only ones that could afford to go to college,
both because of tuition expenses and the loss of income that taking
two to four years off of work inflicted." 7 It therefore became a
demand of the ABA that law schools, in order to become accredited,
must require at least two years of college prior to entry.' The ABA
further demanded that all law schools employ full-time faculty in
"sufficient number ... to insure actual personal acquaintance and
influence with the whole student body"'39 and withheld approval
from any commercial law school. 4° These measures crippled the
efforts of the poor, including almost all recent immigrants, to enter
the legal profession.
The requirement of some degree of college education was explic-
itly for the purpose of excluding all those foreigners who had not
been assimilated through the functions of higher education. In his
famous speech supporting the requirement, Elihu Root declared
that any foreign residue in the immigrant must be "expelled by
the spirit of American institutions." 4' The new standards certainly
had that effect for a time. 'The financial expense of undergraduate
and legal education, in addition to the substantial loss of income
during the seven years required to earn two degrees, eliminated the
most impoverished, among whom racial and ethnic minority group
members were disproportionately concentrated."' 42
The statements of the men who formed those standards prove
the proposition that higher education standards were designed to
keep out the poor and foreign-born and advance the interests of
the rulemakers' clients. Frederic R. Coudert, founder of Coudert
Brothers, for example, in his speech to the American Bar
Association, subtly alluded to the foreigners who were crowding
137. Id. at 29.
138. Am. Bar Ass'n, Special Comm., Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Report
of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the
American Bar Association, 46 A.B.A. REP. 679, 687 (1921) [hereinafter Report of the Special
Committee].
139. Id. at 688.
140. See BROWN, supra note 135, at 45-46.
141. Elihu Root, Individual Liberty and the Responsibility of the Bar, in ADDRESSES ON
GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 516 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916).
142. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 29.
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into the American bar. After blaming "incompetency" for the
popular dislike of the law and legal profession, he went on to
condemn most applicants to the bar, praising "the more intelligent
and better-equipped young men coming from one of the great
university law schools of the country."'43 By implication, then, the
incompetency which was plaguing the American bar was due to the
poor and immigrant attendants of night and part-time schools, as
opposed to the "great university law schools." These "unlearned,
unlettered and utterly untrained young lawyers ... will continue to
have a deleterious effect upon the administration of justice."'44 If
admission to the bar was limited to graduates of the university law
schools, most poor and immigrants would be excluded with that step
alone.
The debates of the Section on Legal Education of the American
Bar Association (the first section established by the ABA,'45
indicating the importance that the ABA attached to it) also firmly
establish that increasing educational requirements were designed
to exclude foreigners. F.M. Danaher, in describing the necessity of
higher standards in New York than elsewhere, specifically named
the influx of immigrants as a reason for these standards.'46 Because
New York was "the dumping ground of the world,"'4 there were too
many applicants for admission to the bar.4 ' This influx of appli-
cants, doubtlessly made up of those who were "dumped" into the
City, "has tended to lower the morals of the profession and to
foster unprofessional conduct." ''  Unprofessional conduct was
synonymous with advertising and solicitation, practices engaged in
by the lawyers for injured workers. 5 ° Danaher then explicitly
affirmed the goal of increasing educational requirements. He
declared that it was necessary "to adopt some of the requirements
of time and cost and special training necessary for admission to the
143. Frederic R. Coudert, The Crisis of the Law and Professional Incompetency, 36 A.B.A.
REP. 677, 682-83 (1911).
144. Id. at 683.
145. SUNDERLAND, supra note 98, at 28.
146. Proceedings of the SLE, 1911, supra note 107, at 646.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 645-46.
149. Id. at 645.
150. See infra Part III.C.
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Bar in European countries,"15' including a requirement that
applicants be "able to speak and write the English language
correctly .... How much proficiency was meant by "correctly" was
in the exclusive power to be determined by the bar admission
authorities. 53 Even those licensed to practice law in their own
countries were required to meet these requirements-unless, of
course, they were from the Anglo-Saxon common law countries, in
which case they could be admitted on motion."M
Edward Lee (dean of a night law school in Chicago) explicitly
identified the true result of the measures at a later meeting:
[I]t would discourage legal education throughout the country,
decrease legal knowledge everywhere, and deprive masses of
people in our large cities, many of them of foreign extraction,
from access to our courts and legal aid for want of lawyers
familiar with their language and distinctive customs. To such
people a lawyer is more than a mere lawyer; he is in addition an
interpreter of the spirit of our laws and of our institutions in his
social and political contact with his kindred.155
Lee identified precisely the results of increasing the educational
standards for admission to the bar: depriving lawyers to the poor
and the immigrant classes. He gave a passionate argument for the
rejection of the new standards, citing the many contributions of the
foreign-born and their worth to practice law in America.'56 His
warning, however, was not heeded, because the exclusion of these
foreign-born was precisely the goal of the new standards. When Lee
made a motion to strike the requirement of college study and
replace it with a more reasonable standard (that is, one that could
151. Proceedings of the SLE, 1911, supra note 107, at 645.
152. Id. at 648.
153. Id. at 647-49.
154. Id. at 647.
155. Edward T. Lee, Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, 46 A.B.A. REP. 656, 668 (1921) [hereinafter Proceedings of the SLE, 1921].
156. Id. at 671-72. Lee even alluded to the opinion of most of the ABA by saying that he
was "sorry to say" that "many Americans" considered these immigrants "undesirables." Id.
at 671. The Section, however, was apparently unmoved, as it took a recess immediately
thereafter, and no one spoke up in support of Lee's speech. Id. at 672.
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possibly be met by the poor and immigrants) his motion could not
even muster a second. 157
The Root Committee report submitted to the Section in 1921
made it clear that "[s]etting higher educational standards for
admission to the bar was [simply] one means chosen to keep the
unwanted out of the profession .... "158 The Committee and the bar
leaders sought a professional ethnic cleansing. The report spoke of
the need "to prevent the admission of the unfit and to eject the
unworthy," and aimed to "purify the stream at its source by causing
a proper system of training to be established and to be required."'' 9
It recommended that, in order to "purify the stream," educational
standards for admission to the bar should be increased, requiring at
least two years of a college education and a three-year, full-time
course of study in a law school. 6 °
The report was entirely dismissive of the difficulties that the poor
faced in attending school full-time. "No man who wants a college
education need go without."'' It cited scholarships and work as
ways the poor can attend college and law school. 6 '"The man of
slender means has now the advantages which once belonged only
to the wealthy."'' The fact of the matter, however, was that
"[i]mpoverished applicants were advised to avoid combining day
work with night law classes because only university law schools
offered access to desirable professional positions."'64 Because the
report effectively excluded night schools from approval, 6 ' the only
way anyone could work through law school had been removed.
157. Id. at 677.
158. James E. Moliterno, Why Formalism?, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 135, 140 (2000).
159. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 138, at 681.
160. Id. at 683-84.
161. Id. at 684.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 682.
164. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 26.
165. It was almost axiomatic among the elite that night schools were anathema; John
Wigmore, at the first meeting of the Section of Legal Education, declared that "the principle
that when a student enters upon his professional preparation in a law school, he must give
to it his whole working time, and that no other and competing occupation is compatible with
an adequate training" should "be fundamental in modern legal education." John H. Wigmore,
A Principle of Orthodox Legal Education, 17 A.B.A. REP. 453, 453 (1894). Note that this
eliminates even the possibility of going to law school full-time and working at night; by the
purest form of this doctrine, the poor are denied all recourse in their pursuit of a legal
education. Id. at 458.
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Furthermore, it was a fact that "[d]espite everything that full-time
schools may do through scholarships and loans for students of
restricted means[,] ... such [full-time] schools draw the great
majority of their students only from the more favored classes in
society." '166 The report's dismissal of the difficulties of attending
college and law school were so obviously contradictory to the real
experience of the immigrants and the poor that one can only
conclude that the exclusion of these people was deliberate.
The report was authorized "to publish from time to time the
names of those law schools which comply with the above standards
and of those which do not .... " This list reveals how concerned the
ABA was with the ability of the poor to enter the legal profession.
By 1936, only one part-time school had been approved by the
American Bar Association, whereas only eight full-time schools had
not been approved.168 Furthermore, "[o]f the 94 institutions on the
approved list for 1936, 90 are connected with colleges or universities
... "169 This limited the options of the poor; although those law
schools unconnected with universities were much cheaper, they
were less well-known. All this was done despite the fact that there
was no empirical evidence that night or non-university law schools
were any less effective in educating lawyers for contemporary
practice. 70 It was now much more difficult for the poor to become
lawyers and for the poor to find lawyers to undertake their legal
needs, despite the superficial concern for them given in the report. 7'
Elihu Root, chairman of the Special Committee that submitted
the report, had warned that "alien influences" must be "expelled by
the spirit of American institutions." '' i Whether he succeeded in
expelling alien influences from the legal profession, the ABA
certainly did a great deal to exclude aliens from it.' 73
166. BROWN, supra note 135, at 43.
167. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 138, at 688.
168. BROWN, supra note 135, at 48-49.
169. Id. at 50.
170. J. Laurence Hurley, Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar, 54 A.B.A. REP. 605, 624-25 (1929) [hereinafter Proceedings of the SLE, 1929].
171. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 138, at 680-81, 685.
172. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 94.
173. See Henry S. Drinker, Jr., in Proceedings of the SLE, 1929, supra note 170, at 621-24.
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Because so many of the unethical lawyers in the country "came
right up out of the gutter into the Bar,"'74 they must be required to
go to college so that they can "absorb the American boy's idea of fair
play,"'75 which essentially meant to abandon "the methods their
fathers had been using in selling shoe strings and other merchan-
dise."'76 What was important was that those poor aspirants "become
Americanized," which could happen "whatever nationality a man
is."'77 Once they had abandoned their culture's way of doing things,
they would be safe members of the bar, not before.
C. Restrictions on Advertisement
One of the most prominent objections to immigrant practices
was that they tended to advertise. The corporation lawyers who
had become the elite in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth cen-
tury America did not advertise; they had no need to do so.178 Elite
lawyers already had connections enough to supply them with new
clients, or they were retained by business as counsel and therefore
had no need of new clients, particularly from the lower classes who
had little or nothing with which to pay them. The fact that the
newer lawyers, on the other hand, did advertise and aggressively
sought new clients, particularly for tort cases taken on a contingent
fee, made advertising ipso facto unethical. 79 Without advertising
and without client solicitation, injured workers would have sig-
nificant difficulty finding representation and insurance adjusters
would have free and exclusive access to negotiate low settlements.'80
No practice of immigrant lawyers so disadvantaged the bar elite's
clients as did advertising and solicitation.
174. Id. at 624.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 622.
177. George W. Wilson, in Proceedings of the SLE, 1929, supra note 170, at 628.
178. See, e.g., Moliterno, supra note 97, at 809 (noting that the elite lawyers formed "a club
that would not compete with one another for clients and who had no need of regularly
attracting new clients through other than social means"); see also AUERBACH, supra note 98,
at 43 (positing that poor lawyers at the time advertised because they "depended upon a
constant client turnover for economic survival').
179. See AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 42-44.
180. See Moliterno, supra note 97, at 791.
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Nearly all advertising was prohibited under the Canons of Ethics.
All "solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements' 181 was
deemed unprofessional; it was "equally unprofessional to procure
business by indirection through touters of any kind ...182 Even
"[i]ndirect advertisement ... by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged, or concerning the manner of their conduct" was pro-
hibited."3 Effectively all advertising was, then, forbidden-except,
of course, for business cards. Those were used by the professional
elite, and therefore could not possibly be unethical. 1" Even the
failure to see ill in advertising was sufficiently condemned that a
Pennsylvania bar applicant was denied admission for seeing "no
wrong in ambulance chasing, buying cases, employing runners,
and advertising." '185
Here again the ideals of the country lawyer, as realized in the
industrial revolution's big business firm, obfuscated the current
situation of the profession.'86 The country lawyer and the big
business lawyer were both well-known in the community; they could
rely on potential clients coming to them. In the urban situation,
however, it was entirely different. Lawyers were not well-known in
the community simply by virtue of their profession; they had to
advertise in order to acquire clients, both for justice's sake and for
their own economic necessities.'87 Nevertheless, the new Canons
of Ethics prohibited nearly all advertising, which took advantage
of the fact that "[t]hese lawyers confronted problems of client pro-
curement which an established corporate practitioner did not
experience"'8 8 in order to injure the practices of the urban and
largely immigrant underclass. Opposition to the "commercialization"
of lawyers, the bugaboo that the established corporate society
presented as the reason for their new prohibition on advertising,
was "an indication of concern with immigrant ghettos and urban
poverty, [and] it demonstrated antagonism toward lawyers from




185. Douglas, supra note 129, at 704.
186. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 42-43.
187. Id. at 43.
188. Id. at 42.
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ethnic minority groups-the profession's new and growing under-
class."'89
Interesting enough, this prohibition on advertising was new. Such
a prohibition would seem perfectly suited to the country lawyer
ethos, but the country lawyers themselves never saw a need to
implement it, and even engaged in the limited advertising that the
technology of their time allowed. Lincoln advertised. 9 ° And while
not quite the usual sort of advertisement, Jefferson, Henry, and
other lawyer-statesmen placed notices in the Virginia Gazette,
warning prospective clients that they would not undertake repre-
sentation without being paid their fee up front.'9 '
One of the ethical treatises on which the new code of ethics was
based, Sharswood's, put no restrictions on advertising, and many
ethical systems, including those of most of the states, permitted
certain amounts of newspaper advertising at least.'92 The new
Canons of Ethics, however, prohibited nearly all advertising; even
business cards received only reluctant approval. 193 This sudden
discovery of a legal norm against lawyer advertising, entirely
baseless in the traditions of the profession, reinforces the conclusion
that the corporate legal community imposed the rule as a client-
advantaging weapon, rather than as an attempt to restore the
image of the profession in the public eye.'
Included in advertising was any direct seeking of clients, in-
cluding simply approaching them, telling them that they probably
had a legal claim, and offering to represent them.'95 This was
considered the height of commercialism, and formed the substance
of what was derisively called "ambulance chasing."'96 The practice
was a near necessity for those engaged in personal injury plaintiffs
practice. Failing to reach clients at an early stage meant that many
189. Id. at 40.
190. ALLEN D. SPIEGEL, A. LINCOLN, ESQUIRE: A SHREWD, SOPHISTICATED LAWYER IN HIS
TIME 23 (2002).
191. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
192. See Moliterno, supra note 97, at 791-92.
193. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
194. See Moliterno, supra note 97, at 791-92.
195. CANONS OF PROFOL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908).
196. Comm. on Code of Prof 1 Ethics, Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the Committee on Code of
Professional Ethics, 32 A.B.A. REP. 676, 682 (1907) [hereinafter Committee on Professional
Ethics].
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or most would already have been visited by insurance claims
personnel, effectively operating on behalf of the potential defen-
dants.'97 The hypocrisy of the elite in this matter is ironic, as one
contemporary commentator noted, saying that "my experience has
been that it is the corporation agents who are the ones who rush to
the hospital, or bedside of the dying, and try to get their releases
from them."'98 The advantage of the corporate defendant was being
undermined by the actions of the plaintiffs' lawyers, so those actions
needed to be prohibited. Indeed, arguably, prohibiting advertising
was the primary reason the ABA leaders set out to adopt the Code
of Ethics.'99 The Canons declared that "[i]t is unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do
so. 2 °0 The combination of new prohibitions clearly were directed at
hurting the practices of the lower class of lawyers and their clients,
and restoring the competitive advantage previously enjoyed by the
elite's clients.
Some of the impetus for the new rules may have been prejudice,
but client-centered monetary considerations appear to have surely
played a role in the prohibition on advertising. Most of the framers
of the code represented business interests; most lawyers who
advertised were serving the poor, often representing them in tort
cases which arose as a result of injuries received in working for
business. "Such claims would be far less likely to be brought if
urban, ethnic, underclass lawyers could be restrained from adver-
tising about their services, soliciting the business of injured
persons, and offering contingent fee arrangements to those unable
to afford a pay-as-you-go lawyer fee,"2 '' especially because most of
those bringing the claims were probably ignorant of their claims'
existences until their lawyers' runners informed them of it. These
advertising restrictions were "[v]irtually the only substantive
197. FREEDMAN, supra note 113, at 239-42; Frank C. McGirr, Sanitation of the Bar:
Exposure at Bar Association Meeting of the Latest Methods for Employing Courts for Vicious
Purposes by Ambulance Chasers, 4 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 5, 6 (1920) [hereinafter Sanitation of the
Bar].
198. Id. at 6.
199. Committee on Professional Ethics, supra note 196, at 681-82.
200. CANONS OF PROFOL ETHICS Canon 28 (1908).
201. Moliterno, supra note 97, at 791.
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changes '2°2 from traditional codes of ethics to the new ABA
canons.0 3 The prohibition left the insurance adjuster free access and
reign over ill-informed and unrepresented plaintiffs. The prohibition
on advertising had no other purpose than the suppression not only
of the largely immigrant lawyers who relied on it for their liveli-
hoods, but also of the largely immigrant blue-collar workers who
made use of those lawyers for the litigation of their claims against
the business interests which the elite lawyers who so despised the
underclass almost universally represented.
D. The Contingent Fee
The contingent fee, by which claims could be brought by those
unable to otherwise afford to hire a lawyer, was the bane of the
organized bar. The bar elite hoped to prohibit it, but succeeded only
in regulating it. This effort at prohibition was even handed; all
lawyers were subject to these restrictions when they charge
contingent fees, just as rich and poor alike were prohibited from
sleeping under bridges.
20 4
A contingent fee is simply an agreement by which payment to the
attorney is subjected to some contingency, generally either favorable
settlement or favorable result at trial. Unlike advertising restric-
tions, the contingent fee had since ancient times been condemned as
champerty, "[a]n agreement between a [stranger] to a lawsuit and
a litigant by which the [stranger] helps pursue the litigant's claim
as consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.""2 5 In
the case of a contingent fee, the attorney was considered a stranger
to the lawsuit-that is, he was neither plaintiff nor defendant-and
he pursued the litigant's claim by paying for it (with his services) in
exchange for part of the settlement. The prohibition made some
202. Id.
203. See id. at 791-92.
204. The law's "majestic equality ... forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (EId. de luxe
1894).
205. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (8th ed. 2004); see also Max Radin, Contingent Fees in
California, 28 CAL. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (1940) (arguing that "[t]he contingent fee certainly
increases the possibility that vexatious and unfounded suits will be brought" and lawyers
considered it a "gross impropriety" and continued to "disapprove" of contingency fees long
after the statute had legalized it).
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degree of sense in the preindustrial society for which it was made;
contingent fees were unnecessary, as the tort claims for which
contingent fees primarily evolved were comparatively rare and
litigants were more likely to be on a level playing field financially.2 °6
Allowing contingent fees in such a situation would have been
nothing more than giving attorneys and clients "the means and
perhaps the incentive to file a lawsuit for its 'nuisance' value and
obtain a quick settlement."2 7 It might even encourage perjury,
because a lawyer, knowing that his fee rests upon his prevailing,
may encourage his client or witnesses to stretch or invent the truth
in the direction of a favorable result.208 The contingent fee offered
little benefit and substantial cost. With the advent of industrializa-
tion, however, the balance of the benefits and costs of the prudential
value of the contingent fee radically changed, and early in this
period, the Supreme Court made clear that the contingent fee was
a lawful fee arrangement.0 9
It was "the Industrial Revolution which brought into sharp
contrast the group of lawyers who were willing to take cases on
contingencies and those who were not. 210 The division was, of
course, that between hoi polloi and the elite:
The latter [those who would not take a case on contingency]
represented the defendant railroads, steamships, factories,
power companies. They were the admitted leaders of the bar.
The former [those who would take contingent fees] were the
206. See MARC M. SCHNEIER, CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT LAW 14-15 (1999) (stating that in
preindustrial society, tort law "was still virtually undeveloped" consisting mostly of"matters
between individuals, largely assaults, trespasses, and the like").
207. Richard M. Birnholz, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 949, 953 (1990) (citing criticisms leveled at the contingent fee arrangement); see also
Radin, supra note 205, at 589.
208. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 40 (1989) (stating that contingent fees are
prohibited in criminal cases because of the risk of the attorney impeding justice, "presumably
by suborning perjury"); see, e.g., Honorable George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional
Ethics, 32 A.B.A. REP. 160-64 (1907), quoted in Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor To Have
Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 255 (1998) (stating that an attorney on a contingent fee would "be
tempted to make success, at all hazards and by all means, the sole end of his exertions").
209. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 556-58 (1877).
210. Radin, supra note 205, at 588.
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young lawyers struggling to make a living. They could scarcely
help being an inferior class.21'
The continued opposition to contingent fees made this division
perfectly obvious. Contingent fees, often the only way a poor person
could afford any sort of legal service, were the heart of the immi-
grant lawyer's practice; without them, no one could afford his
services, he could not afford to live, and his practice would necessar-
ily fall to the wayside. 212 Both the poor and the immigrant lawyer
needed the contingent fee for their survival. The injured worker's
claim had almost no chance of being brought without the arrange-
213
ment.
The lawyer needed the contingent fee because he was not part of
the new elite which could rely upon retainment by the great
industrial corporations for his livelihood." 4 The plaintiffs lawyer
required a certain degree of client turnover in order to survive, and
offering a contingent fee to those otherwise unable to pay for legal
services was the only way to ensure that turnover.21 The poor
worker needed contingent fees even more. Auerbach eloquently
described the necessity of such fees for the poor:
An alarming proliferation of work and transportation accidents,
most often borne by those least able to afford lawyers' fees,
generated human tragedies which a profit economy and its legal
doctrines exacerbated. Accident victims-and the surviving
members of their families-were compelled to bear the full
burden for the risks inherent in dangerous work. Corporate
profit was the primary social value.... [L]egal services were
available only to those who could afford to purchase them....
... In more than half of all work-accident fatalities in Alle-
gheny County [for example], widows and children bore the entire
income loss. In fewer than one-third of these cases did an
employer pay as much as five hundred dollars-the equivalent
of a single year's income for the lowest-paid workers. Similarly,
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 50.
213. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society,
54 CAL. L. REV. 792, 792 (1966) (describing the author's experience as an immigrant being
incapable of pursuing a claim because of his lack of money for a retainer).
214. See Radin, supra note 205, at 588.
215. See AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 45.
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more than half of all injured workers received no compensation;
only 5 percent were fully compensated for their lost working
time while disabled.216
Workers in such situations could hardly afford the out-of-pocket
expense of retaining a lawyer at an hourly rate, particularly with
the substantial risk of losing, thus suffering not only the expenses
of their injuries but also the equally unrequited expenses of an
unsuccessful legal venture. The contingent fee, however, provided
a way for such workers to pursue their claims without worsening
their situation. It was and is a necessary consequence of the desire
to provide everyone with the capability of pursuing meritorious legal
claims.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the
new code of ethics was being formed and promulgated, the pruden-
tial value of the contingent fee was already outweighing the risks
beyond any serious question. In a rapidly growing and industrial-
ized society, "[tihere were far too many persons who could pay no
retainers and far too many lawyers who could not afford to insist
on them." '217 And not every lawyer could do what Jefferson and
Henry had done 130 years removed, demanding payment up front.21
In a time in which workers had precious little assistance, "the
contingent fee arrangement did enable some workers to secure
otherwise unattainable legal services., 219 The balance of the possi-
bility of unmeritorious suits being brought and the certainty of the
denial of any recourse for the wrongfully injured and others with
legal claims can come down on only one side. Furthermore, one
could argue whether the possibility of unmeritorious suits is really
a problem unique to, or even especially associated with, the
contingent fee agreement, since no one would deny "that vexatious
and unfounded suits have been brought by men who could and did
pay substantial attorneys' fees for that purpose. '22
216. See id. at 44 (citing CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WoRK-ACCIDENTSANDTHE LAW 119-24 (1910)).
217. Radin, supra note 205, at 588.
218. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
219. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 45.
220. James Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The "Acquisition of an Interest
and Financial Assistance in Litigation," 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 223, 245 (2003); Radin,
supra note 205, at 589.
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However, elite corporate lawyers bemoaned the existence of the
contingent fee as an attack upon legal professionalism. "Nothing
plunged the professional elite deeper into despair than contingent
fees and the proliferation of negligence lawyers whose practice
depended upon them." '221 Corporate clients were losing money on the
suits that contingent fees made possible, which gave the corporate
legal elite no end of headache. Frank C. McGirr noted this in a
debate concerning the contingent fee. He noticed "that every lawyer
that got up here today in favor of this bill [which restricted contin-
gent fees] was a corporation lawyer. Why they are so opposed to
contingent fees I do not know." '222 McGirr undoubtedly knew exactly
why the corporate lawyers were opposed to contingent fees.223
No objection to the contingent fee was too ridiculous or contrary
to common sense to be forwarded as dispositive. One objection, for
example, was that the client's interests are likely to suffer from the
lawyer's urge to make as much money as possible.224 Putting aside
the assumption that a lawyer on a contingent fee will be greedier
than one on an hourly fee (a questionable assumption at best), the
more likely conclusion is that a lawyer would be more zealous for his
client's interests, because he is receiving part of the recovery. The
alternative would be an hourly fee lawyer, representing a one-time
personal injury client. An hourly lawyer, unlike the contingent fee
lawyer, receives his fee whether he wins or loses, and has signifi-
cantly less monetary incentive to pursue his client's goals. Never-
theless, this objection was voiced often, as though questioning its
obviously specious reasoning amounted to sympathizing with greed
itself.
The disapproval of the contingent fee was pervasive among the
elite. Therefore, when this same elite decided to draw up a code of
ethics, it drew up a special canon intended to sharply limit the
contingent fee.
The Canons could not, of course, eliminate the contingent fee
entirely because the laws of the United States considered the
validity of such fees "beyond legitimate controversy" as early as
221. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 45.
222. Sanitation of the Bar, supra note 197, at 11.
223. Note, Legal Ethics-Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 182, 185 (1955).
224. CANONS OF PROFL ETHICS Canon 13 (1908).
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1877.225 Indeed, even many state codes of ethics, based largely upon
the Alabama code,226 acknowledged that the contingent fee was
valid, including a statement that contingent fees can be higher
than others because of the risk involved.22 7 Contingent fees were
therefore put under what was intended to be a severe stricture:
the Canons declared that they "should be under the supervision of
the Court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges. 228
The rationale for so restricting contingent fees, "that clients may
be protected from unjust charges,' 29 is transparently specious.
Auerbach treated this proposition with scorn, quipping that "[c]ourt
supervision was justified on behalf of the personal injury victim,
who presumably needed protection from his attorney more than he
needed monetary damages for his injury."23 Presumably the writers
of the canon reasoned that contingent fees were often excessive.
However, all fees were subject to the preceding canon, which
proposed no fewer than six factors for consideration in setting a
neither exorbitant nor minimal fee.23' Indeed, one of those factors
was precisely whether the fee was contingent.232 Why, then, were
contingent fees subject to such additional scrutiny? Why insult the
lawyer who worked for contingent fees with the presumption that
he would charge extravagant fees for minimal service? 233 The
lawyers who used contingent fees represented clients who would
otherwise not have the wherewithal to maintain their claims
225. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 556 (1877).
226. See Committee on Professional Ethics, supra note 196, at 678; see also Moliterno, supra
note 97, at 789.
227. See Committee on Professional Ethics, supra note 196, at 709. While most of the codes
did say that contingent fees "lead to many abuses," and that "certain compensation is to be
preferred," no strictures were leveled against them that were not leveled against other forms
of compensation. Id. at 710.
228. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHIcs Canon 13 (1908).
229. Id.
230. AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 46.
231. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 12 (1908).
232. Id. Canon 11.
233. Auerbach suggests that the canon was meant at least partially as an insult, noting
that one opinion at the meetings that formed the canon was that "[n]o self-respecting attorney
... would tolerate judicial scrutiny of his fee schedules," and that the canon was more an effort
"to distribute professional status according to a lawyer's willingness to contract for contingent
fees" than to eliminate the practice entirely. See AUERBACH, supra note 98, at 46.
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against the rulemakers' clients. That may have been reason enough
to impose the added supervision on the fee arrangement.
The standard condemnation of ambulance chasing, for example,
including its system of runners who informed injured parties of
their claims and recommended the services of a lawyer, was that it
created litigation that otherwise would not have existed, fomenting
disputes and otherwise disrupting society. The ABA condemned it
on these grounds, declaring that it was "[s]tirring up strife and
litigation" and that "to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of
action" was an unethical practice.234 However, the contingent fee
upon which these ambulance chasers rested their practices was
condemned upon the exact opposite grounds. The elite contended
that, because it was more lucrative to settle a case than to litigate
it, that an ambulance chaser on a contingent fee was likely to settle
rather than litigate, which might injure the interests of his client.235
Their criticisms have come full circle; ambulance chasing was
unethical because it stirred up litigation, whereas the contingent fee
was unethical, or at least presumptively so, because it encouraged
settlement rather than litigation. The new legal underclass and
their clients simply could not win-but that was, after all, the idea.
The elite tried to make it that way, and the legal profession has
labored under their antipoor code and its progeny ever since.
IV. WHAT Is To BE DONE?
What is to be done about this problem? Probably quite little. The
problem identified here is inherent in the poor fit between the
lawyer's customary role and the role of public law maker. Many
lawyer-lawmakers will overcome the shortcoming, as they have for
centuries. Some will succumb to its dramatic ways. Many will be
affected by it, even if imperceptibly. No serious change in either role
should be contemplated that would eliminate the problem.
Short of a dramatic change that would undoubtedly do more harm
than good, I have only a modest suggestion for now. Even if in the
end, the lawyer's advantages outweigh this disadvantage, we should
234. See CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 28 (1908).
235. Legal Ethics-Ambulance Chasing, supra note 223, at 185.
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be aware of the disadvantage and guard against it to the extent
possible. We should create more restraints on client-favoring actions
on the part of lawyer-legislators. We should expect the ALI and ABA
to populate committees charged with law improvement in balanced
ways, so that the impact of the powerful incentive to favor client
interests in those contexts can be tempered.
Aurbach's suggestion was to strip the profession of self-gover-
nance: 'Treatment of the legal profession as a public profession,
with extensive lay control, would drastically alter its present
identity as a collection of individuals whose fealty to the public is
secondary to its service to paying clients. 236
There are currently in place various restraints on activities of
legislators, 237 some of which fall especially on lawyer-legislators.238
But they ask little. For example, there are modest restrictions on
representational activities during and after legislative service. 9
They could ask more. For example, they might restrict activities of
legislators' partners.24 ° Might these restrictions dissuade some
lawyers from "serving" in these capacities? One would hope so. At
least we should hope that these restrictions will dissuade the lawyer
who enters public service to advance her own goals and those of her
clients. That would be a positive effect. The lawyer least likely to be
dissuaded is the one who can, in fact, put client interests aside and
consider questions in a broader way. Such a lawyer would not be
dissuaded by well-drafted restrictions on client-favoring activity.
Nor would such restrictions dissuade the lawyer who understands
and accepts the need to put the natural tendencies of client-favoring
conduct aside.
236. Jerold S. Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1287,
1292-93 (1976).
237. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313 (West 2008); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-84-11 to
-18 (West 2008); MISS. CODEANN. § 25-4-105 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-17 (West
2001).
238. Matter of Advisory Comm. on Profl Ethics Opinion 621,608 A.2d 880, 886 (N.J. 1992).
239. See supra note 237.
240. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Lawyers have always participated in great numbers as lawmak-
ers. Conventional wisdom says they have a comparative advantage
in this role and no doubt some lawyer attributes advantage lawyers
in the role of public official. But lawyers have one inherent disad-
vantage in this role: they are lawyers. By training, practice, and
temperament, they are oriented toward representing a client's
interests despite the contrary interests of the public.
This disadvantage has manifested itself in dramatic ways, but
more often is likely to be a subtle influence on the perspective of the
lawyer-lawmaker. It should be guarded against to the limited extent
possible. Lawyers may be better suited to other citizen lawyer roles.
Understanding this limitation may allow a better allocation of
public service minded lawyers' energy and effort.
